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SUMMARY
The “European refugee/migrant crisis” is a geopolitical designation with which the 
media, politics and the general public have labelled the arrival of a large number of 
refugees into the European Union in 2015 and 2016. The article analyses the spatial 
distribution of asylum seekers in the European Union during the 2011–2016 period. 
It focuses on how changes of the border regimes on the external and internal bor-
ders of the European Union have influenced the movement of asylum seekers and 
the spatial distribution of asylum applications during the “crisis”. It raises attention 
to the growing importance of the militarisation of borders and the securitisation of 
migration flows for the spatial distribution of the asylum applicants. The research is 
based on the analysis of the Eurostat data on the total number of asylum applicants 
in member states between 2011 and 2016. Although changes in border regimes were 
not the only factor influencing the spatial distribution of asylum seekers during the 
“European refugee/migrant crisis”, their effects can be used to demonstrate the re-
strictions asylum seekers are facing on their journey. The main aim of the article is to 
reflect on the use of the geographical designation “Europe”/”European” in the con-
text of the “refugee/migrant crisis”. Using this designation creates the perception of 
a unified, borderless space, in which individuals can freely choose their asylum des-
tination. The discourse of “the European refugee/migrant crisis” often presents the 
European Union as “an open asylum shopping centre” in which asylum seekers can 
pick whatever host they want.  The article opposes this notion and emphasises the 
limitations and the effect that contingency plays in the choice of asylum destination.
KEY WORDS: migrations, refugees, border regimes, European Union, “European 
refugee/migrant crisis” 
INTRODUCTION
The number of asylum applicants in countries of the European Union 
has continuously grown from 2008 to 2016. 2015 was a special milestone, 
when over a million asylum applications were submitted in the EU. The 
arrival of a large number of asylum seekers via the Balkan route triggered 
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much attention in the media, politics and the general public. Several per-
ceptions formed on who the new arrivals are and how their arrival will 
influence life in Europe (Berry, Garcia-Blanco and Moore, 2016; Goodman, 
Sirriyeh and McMahon, 2017; Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017; Holmes 
and Castañeda, 2016; Hoyer, 2016; Jontes, 2017; Pajnik, 2017; Zhang and 
Hellmueller, 2017). The media designated the event as a “European refu-
gee/migrant crisis”1 (refer to BBC, Delo, RAI, Spiegel, TVN24 media portray-
als2). This term has become a convenient geopolitical designation that offers 
a limited understanding of the events and creates a specific perception and 
categorization. As all geopolitical designations, it reduces the complexity of 
reality and creates binary contrasts (Europe/rest of the world, legal/illegal 
migrations, migrants/refugees, citizen/foreigner) that serve as a separator 
between “them” and “us”. At the same time, it creates and supports certain 
ideas on what is possible politically, what is irrelevant and what we should 
fear (Rajaram, 2015). 
All of this has brought much criticism to the designation “European 
refugee/migrant crisis” and all of its related narrations. The distinction be-
tween refugees and migrants, or “true refugees” and “economic migrants” 
attracted the most attention (Čapo, 2016; Goodman, Sirriyeh and McMahon, 
2017; Vogrinc, 2015; Yarris and Castañeda, 2015; Župarić-Iljić et al., 2015). 
Some authors warned of the problematic use of the term “crisis”3. This is 
said to be primarily used to dramatize events and excuse specific policies 
and measures by countries (Bojadzijev and Mezzadra, 2015; Čapo, 2016; 
De Genova, 2017; Hammond, 2015; Sardelić, 2017). Less attention has been 
placed on the varying spatial or geographical perceptions connected to the 
designation “European refugee/migrant crisis”. 
1 The use of the designation “refugee/migrant” is not intended for distinguishing between 
“true refugees” and “economic migrants”, but rather stresses the great variations in un-
derstanding and interpretations of the events. The author agrees with Župarić-Iljić et al. 
(2015) and Hammond (2015), who advocate the use of the term refugee crisis. 
2 Europe migrant crisis, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32395181 (7 April 
2016); Dosje: Begunska kriza, Delo, http://www.delo.si/assets/info5/dosje/begunska-kriza/
goto.html (7 April 2016); L’emergenza Migranti In Europa, RAI, http://www.rainews.it/
ran24/speciali/2015/la_crisi_dei_migranti_esplode_in_europa/ (7 April 2016); European 
Refugee Crisis – Related articles, background features and opinions about this topic, Spie-
gel, http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/european_refugee_crisis/ (7 April 2016); 
Kryzys migracyjny w Europie, TVN24, http://www.tvn24.pl/raporty/imigracyjny-kryzys-
w-europie,975 (7 April 2016).
3 The author agrees with those who problematize the use of the term crisis, so it is ex-
pressed in quotation marks. 
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The article problemizes the usage of the geographical designation “Eu-
rope” and “European” in the context of the “refugee/migrant crisis”. The 
author believes the usage of this designation is problematic, as it blurs 
the complex spatiality of the event and gives the impression that this is 
a uniquely European “problem”. It creates a binary division of space into 
Europe and the European neighbourhood. The first is presented as the key 
asylum area, the second as the origin or the transit area of the refugees/
migrants. This neglects and decreases the internal heterogeneousness and 
complexity of both areas. The use of the geographical designator “Europe” 
is also problematic, because it is generally used as a synonym for the Euro-
pean Union4. One of the main objectives of the European Union has been “to 
maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, 
in which the free movement of persons is assured” (see Consolidated Ver-
sion of The Treaty on European Union, Article 2–45). The abolition of border 
controls on internal borders between the member countries of the Schengen 
area and the ability of EU citizens to move without restrictions from one 
member state to another have produced the notion of the European Union 
as a unified, borderless space, in which free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured. In the context of the “refugee/migration cri-
sis”, this idea of a “united borderless Europe” creates the impression that 
asylum seekers may freely select their asylum destination after entering the 
European Union. The spatial distribution of the asylum seekers is therefore 
the result of their wishes and calculations.
The article challenges this assumption by highlighting the limits of the 
notion of a “united borderless Europe”. First and foremost, the article em-
phasizes the continuing importance of borders in the European Union. The 
“European refugee/migrant crisis” has demonstrated the limits of a “Eu-
rope without borders”. The restoration of internal border controls and the 
growing securitization and militarization of borders (see Jones and John-
son, 2016) has had a tremendous effect on the permeability of national 
borders, especially for third-country nationals. The idea of a “borderless 
Europe” also neglects the fact that the removal of border controls leads to 
the increase of internal control mechanisms (e.g., police activities at railway 
stations, airports, highways and city centers) across the national territories 
of the individual member countries (Kunz and Leinonen, 2007). Another of-
4 The usurpation of the term Europe by western European countries and the European Un-
ion has its roots in the cold-war geopolitical spatiality of Europe (more in Debeljak, 2004; 
Murphy, 2005; Rogelj, 2006). 
5 Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT.
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ten-neglected aspect of a “borderless Europe” is the fact that not all member 
states (Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ireland and United Kingdom) are part 
of the Schengen area. When talking about a “Europe without borders”, the 
distinction between the Schengen area and the area of the European Union 
is often blurred or neglected. Last but not least, it is important to acknowl-
edge important differences in how asylum seekers are treated in different 
member states. In this regard, the harmonization and “Europeanization” 
of asylum policy in the European Union has not created a unified space 
(Toshkov and de Haan, 2012). 
The article analyses the spatiality of the “European refugee/migrant cri-
sis”, in particular how it was influenced by the changes in the border re-
gimes. This particular factor is used in order to highlight the fact that the 
selection of the asylum country is often the result of a set of circumstances, 
on which asylum seekers have no influence, not of a premeditated plan. 
Changes in border regimes was not the only or the most important factor in-
fluencing the spatial distribution of asylum seekers in the European Union 
during the “European refugee/migrant crisis”, but it can be used in order to 
demonstrate the limits the asylum seekers are facing. 
The introductory section is followed by a brief description of the main 
methodological problem. Next, some key aspects of modern migrations are 
presented, which are important for understanding the spatiality of the “Eu-
ropean refugee/migrant crisis”. The data analysis of the asylum applicants 
in countries of the European Union in the period 2011–2016 constitutes the 
central part of the article. It should be mentioned that the analysis is not 
intended for categorizing countries based on their levels of “affliction”. By 
illustrating the heterogeneous geography of the phenomenon, we wish to 
stress its complexity and dynamism, while at the same time unveil the ef-
fect of changes in border regimes on the spatial distribution of the asylum 
seekers. All of this is intended to disprove the notion of asylum shopping6, 
which has become an intricate part of the discourse on the “European refu-
gee/migration crisis”. 
6 The EU defines the term asylum shopping as a phenomenon where an asylum seeker ap-
plies for asylum in more than one EU State or chooses one EU State in preference to others 
on the basis of a perceived higher standard of reception conditions or social security as-
sistance (EMN Glossary, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/asylum-shopping_en). 
In order to prevent such practices, the EU introduced so-called Dublin regulation as part 
of the Common European Asylum System. The regulation determines the EU Member 
State responsible for examining an asylum application. In the general, discourse sur-
rounding the “European refugee/migrant crisis” refugees coming to the EU was often 
portrayed as asylum shopping since they did not claim asylum in the first safe country on 
their route or in the first EU member state (see Kogovšek Šalamon and Bajt, 2016).
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METHODOLOGY
The complexity and dynamic nature of the “European refugee/migrant 
crisis” is demonstrated using the spatial data analysis on asylum applicants 
in countries of the European Union for the period 2011–2016. The analysis 
was based on the Eurostat’s Asylum database and first time asylum applicants 
by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded). It can be used to 
reliably ascertain the spatial distribution of asylum seekers for the area of 
the European Union. The analysis included data from 2011 to 2016. Even 
though the term “European refugee/migrant crisis” was used since the 
summer of 2015, the beginning of this process could be dated back to 2011, 
when the number of asylum applications in the EU rose again after a longer 
period above 300,000. 
From a methodological standpoint, it would be best to use data on the 
number of first-time applicants, but since these are not available for some 
countries, the data on the total number of asylum applicants were used in-
stead. It should be noted that an individual might submit an application 
in several countries, so the data do not reflect the actual number of asylum 
applicants in the EU. Their number is almost impossible to determine accu-
rately. Numerous statistical data, reports and research prove indirectly that 
most of those who applied for asylum in Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovenia and 
Croatia have left the aforementioned countries and reapplied for asylum in 
other countries7. 
Statistical data on the asylum applicants hide the dynamic nature of the 
phenomenon. The route to the final destination is often long and unpredict-
able. The speed of the journey depends on numerous factors, on which the 
asylum applicants have no influence. They are often forced to linger in tran-
sition countries for a longer period. This must be taken into account when 
interpreting the spatiality of the “European refugee/migrant crisis”. Despite 
the fact that many transit countries recorded a relatively small number of 
asylum applications at the height of the events, the transition of a great 
number of asylum seekers had a profound political and social influence on 
them. 
7 The extremely small number of final decisions regarding the asylum processes (Eurostat, 
2017c), the large number of retracted applications (Eurostat, 2017b) and the numerous 
applications for jurisdiction transfer within the Dublin Regulation (Eurostat, 2016) point 
to a great discrepancy between the official and actual number of asylum applicants in 
the mentioned countries. Other non-governmental organizations and researchers have 
also come to a similar conclusion (see Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2015; McLaughlin, 
2016; PIC, 2017). 
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The data used conceal the vast differences in the spatial distribution of 
the asylum applicants within countries. The data on the accommodation 
capabilities in the most important host countries point to a concentration 
of these in larger urban centres despite the introduction of regional and lo-
cal quotas, which was intended for the countries to more evenly disperse 
them across the entire territory of the country (AIDA, 2017; BAMF, 2017; 
Migrationsverket, 2017). The same goes for countries of transit, where the 
main entry and exit points and some larger urban centres were the most 
exposed. At the height of the “crisis”, during the Balkan corridor, the coun-
tries organized the transport of the refugees between the entry and exit 
points themselves. At the same time, they introduced security measures to 
try and isolate the reception and accommodation centres from the local in-
habitants as much as possible (Kogovšek Šalamon, 2016; Lunac ̌ek and Meh, 
2016; Petrović, 2016).
IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF MODERN FORCED MIGRATION 
FLOWS
Prior to the data analysis, three characteristics of modern forced migra-
tions must be pointed out, as they are important for understanding the spa-
tiality of the “European refugee/migrant crisis”. The first is their “mixed” 
nature. Forced migrants often have more motives for migrating. Searching 
for a refuge from violence and persecution is the most important, but not the 
only reason (Van Hear, 2012). The other motives are often the main reason, 
why some forced migrants do not look for refuge in the first safe country 
(in the case of the EU, these are the countries on the outer border), but look 
for safety in countries, in which they have relatives and friends, countries 
with a higher economic standard and a high level of protection for asylum 
seekers and refugees (Brekke and Aarset, 2009; Hatton, 2004; Havinga and 
Böcker, 1999; Neumayer, 2004; Zetter et al., 2003). 
The other important characteristic is the transitory nature of forced mi-
grations. An increasing number of asylum seekers passes through several 
transit countries on their way to the final destination, in which they can 
spend a greater amount of time (Koser and Pinkerton, 2002). Transit migra-
tions also occur between individual EU members, especially between coun-
tries at the southern and eastern border and its northern and western part. 
The important differences in reception and accommodation conditions, liv-
ing standard, the labour market conditions and access to government assist-
ance drives the asylum seekers to migrate within the EU (Brekke and Broch-
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mann, 2015; Lukić, 2016). The changing asylum policies and stricter border 
controls also greatly influence the transit nature of forced migrations. The 
asylum applicants are often forced to ask for protection in countries of tran-
sit in order to escape being deported. In some cases, they utilize the asylum 
processes, so they can rest and prepare for their continued journey (Lukić, 
2016). 
The third important characteristic of modern forced migrations is their 
adaptability. The choice of the transit route and the asylum destination is 
constantly adapting to the wider political, economic and social context, in 
which they are unfolding. Forced migrations are especially sensitive to any 
kind of change in the asylum policies (number of granted requests, rights 
of asylum seekers, asylum processes…) and the border regimes (immigra-
tion policies, oversight and border control). Studies so far have shown that 
at the beginning of their journey, most asylum seekers are not informed on 
the differences in the asylum policies between countries and that they do 
not travel according to a predetermined itinerary towards a predetermined 
destination (Hatton, 2004; Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Koser and Pinkerton, 
2002; Zetter et al., 2003). The decision on the final destination is often made 
during the journey itself. Due to the lack of reliable information, these de-
cisions are often made based on the opinions, suggestions and rumours 
coming from relatives, friends, other migrants and smugglers (Brekke and 
Aarset, 2009; Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Koser and Pinkerton, 2002; Robin-
son and Segrott, 2002). 
WHAT INFLUENCES THE CHOICE OF DESTINATION?
These characteristics are vital for understanding the spatiality of the 
“European refugee/migrant crisis”, as they attest that forced migrations are 
an extremely dynamic and often unpredictable phenomenon. Even a brief 
overview of data on asylum applicants for the period 2011–2016 shows big 
changes in their spatial dispersion that occurred in a short period. Two key 
questions come to the forefront. Why did these changes occur? To what 
extent can asylum applicants choose their asylum destination?
Existing research has detected a number of factors that greatly affect the 
attraction of certain asylum destinations (Havinga and Böcker, 1999; Lukić, 
2016; McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016; Robinson and Segrott, 2002). Böcker 
and Havinga (1998) differentiate between three groups of factors. Ties be-
tween the country of origin and the country of asylum represent the first 
set. It includes former colonial ties, linguistic and cultural ties or similari-
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ties, migration links (existing refugee or immigrant communities), political 
and economic relations between countries. The characteristics of the desti-
nation country represent the second set. It consists of asylum policy (rec-
ognition rates, rights enjoyed by asylum seekers and access to the labour 
market), economic situation, and real or perceived image of the destina-
tion country (human rights reputation, attitude towards immigrants, eco-
nomic image). Events during the actual flight and journey compose the last 
set. Geographic proximity, air routes, activities of the agents who organize 
travel arrangements, barriers, controls and checks on the path are the most 
important factors in the last set. 
The rapid changes in the spatiality of the “European refugee/migrant 
crisis” show that rather than the factors from the first two, the factors from 
the third group have influenced it the most. Among these, the role of the 
border regimes should be especially highlighted. These have an important 
effect on the transit routes and an indirect effect on the choice of the asylum 
destination. The changes in border regimes can quickly and extremely ef-
fectively reshape the spatial dispersion of the asylum applicants. Changes 
in border regimes and border management play a central role in the new 
EU migration policy. Better border management with an emphasis on rein-
forced control on the external borders is one of the four pillars of the Euro-
pean Agenda on Migration8, which was adopted as a direct response to the 
crisis. The European Union has invested substantial resources in improving 
security at the external borders and tackling migrant smuggling. One of the 
results of the new policy was the transformation of Frontex into the Euro-
pean Border and Coast Guard Agency. The new agency has more responsi-
bilities in the field of border management and substantially more resources. 
The existence of varying regimes at EU’s external and internal borders at 
the same time refutes the idea of the EU as a unified, borderless space, in 
which applicants are free to choose their country of asylum. 
Even though the analysis emphasizes the importance of border regimes, 
this does not negate the importance of the other factors. The reality is that 
there is an individual behind each application who must make decisions 
based on the information and options that are available at a given moment. 
The decision is often influenced by factors on which an individual applicant 
has no influence. Aside from the border regimes, the role of asylum policy 
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must also be stressed (Barthel and Neumayer, 2015; Hatton, 2005; McAuliffe 
and Jayasuriya, 2016) as well as smuggling networks (Brekke and Aarset, 
2009). The selection of the asylum destination is therefore usually the re-
sult of a set of circumstances, rather than a pre-prepared plan based on the 
wishes and calculations of an individual. 
Especially important are different push-back practices and deportations 
under the Dublin III Regulation and readmission agreements. The situation 
in Slovenia in 2016 illustrates the case. After closing the Balkan corridor in 
February 2016 and the increased oversight on the Austrian-Slovenian and 
German-Austrian borders, many refugees were stranded in Slovenia. Under 
the readmission agreements, Slovenia could deport them back to Croatia 
or other countries on the Balkan migration route, if they did not request 
asylum in Slovenia. Consequently, Slovenia marked a great increase in the 
number of asylum applications, from 277 in 2015 to 1308 in 2016 (Ministry 
of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia, 2017). For most, this was merely 
a tactical move before continuing on. Most asylum applicants leave Slov-
enia before the final decision on their application. In 2016, 1136 applications 
were processed in Slovenia. The great majority of the processed (870 cases 
or 76.6% of all applications) were retracted, because the applicants had left 
the country before the process was finished (Ministry of the Interior of the 
Republic of Slovenia, 2017; PIC, 2017). Some decided to stay despite their 
original plan. Uncertainty in continuing the route and the inability to fi-
nance a continued journey were important factors. Due to the increased 
control on the intra-Schengen borders, continuing the journey was only 
possible with the help of smugglers. At the same time, the stricter enforce-
ment of the Dublin Regulation has increased the possibility of deportation 
back to Slovenia.
BORDER REGIMES AND THE SPATIALITY OF THE 
“EUROPEAN REFUGEE/MIGRANT CRISIS”
Since 2011, the EU has marked a swift rise of the number of asylum ap-
plicants. It reached its peak in 2015, when over 1.3 million asylum applica-
tions were submitted9 (Figure 1). The increase was especially high, as that 
number had been relatively low and stable in the previous period (between 
9 Despite the fact that the media reporting in the time of the “European refugee/migrant 
crisis” talked much about the uniqueness of the event, it should be mentioned that the 
numbers of asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016 were very similar to the numbers from the 
early 1990s, when war raged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The statistical data 
(Figure 1) does not reflect this, because it does not include all of today’s members. 
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2004 and 2011). Before presenting the detailed data analysis for the period 
2011–2016, two characteristics of the spatial dispersion of the asylum appli-
cants in the “pre-crisis (2004–2010)” period should be mentioned.10
Figure 1.  Total number of asylum applicants in European Union 
member states (EU 28) from 1985 to 2015
Note: The dots on the graph represent the number of country data included in the 
calculation of the total number of asylum seekers. Due to the change in the methodo-
logy, the data prior to 2008 is not fully compatible with the newer data
Source: Eurostat (2015). Asylum applicants by citizenship till 2007 Annual data (roun-
ded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyctz&lang=en; Eu-
rostat (2017c). First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex Annual 
aggregated data (rounded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_
asydcfsta&lang=en; UNCHR (2016). Refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR 
by country/territory of asylum, mid-2015 (or latest available estimates), http://popstats.un-
hcr.org/en/overview.
The first characteristic is a high concentration and a relatively equal dis-
persion of the asylum applicants in the economically most developed EU 
members. France stands out somewhat as the main host country, as it re-
ceived about 18% of all applications in the EU in the period 2004–2010. It 
was followed by Great Britain, Germany, Sweden, Austria, Belgium, Italy 
and the Netherlands (Eurostat, 2015, 2017c). With the exception of Italy, 
10 For data analysis on asylum applicants to the EU prior to 2004, see Böcker and Havinga, 
1998; Futo, Jandl and Karsakova, 2005; Hatton, 2004, 2009.
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all the mentioned countries have a long history of immigration, numerous 
migrant communities and a high level of protection for asylum applications 
and refugees. 
The rise in the number of asylum applicants in the countries at the south-
ern external border of the EU, especially in Greece and in Italy and to a 
lesser extent in Spain is the second important characteristic of the pre-crisis 
period. The growth is connected to the increased role of the Mediterrane-
an Sea as the central migration route for entering the EU (Triandafyllidou 
and Ambrosini, 2011). As a reaction to the new circumstances, the coun-
tries began changing their border regimes and establish a harsher asylum 
policy. The new approach was based on bilateral collaboration agreements 
on migration with the key countries of transit in northern Africa11 and on 
shaping military-police operations for controlling see routes between North 
Africa and Europe (McDonough and Tsourdi, 2012; Triandafyllidou and 
Ambrosini, 2011). These two measures have greatly decreased migrations 
through the Western Mediterranean and Central Mediterranean migration 
route, which heavily decreased the number of asylum applicants in Italy 
and Spain. The decreased number of applicants in Greece was the result 
of the economic crisis and a poor asylum system (Coluccello and Kretsos, 
2015; McDonough and Tsourdi, 2012; Videmšek, 2016). 
Table 1.  Total number of asylum applicants in EU countries between 2011 
and 2016 
Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
EU28 309,040 335,290 431,090 626,960 1,322,825 1,259,955
Germany 53,235 77,485 126,705 202,645 476,510 745,155
Italy 40,315 17,335 26,620 64,625 83,540 122,960
France 57,330 61,440 66,265 64,310 76,165 84,270
Greece 9,310 9,575 8,225 9,430 13,205 51,110
Austria 14,420 17,415 17,500 28,035 88,160 42,255
United Kingdom 26,915 28,800 30,585 32,785 40,160 38,785
Hungary 1,690 2,155 18,895 42,775 177,135 29,430
Sweden 29,650 43,855 54,270 81,180 162,450 28,790
Netherlands 14,590 13,095 13,060 24,495 44,970 20,945
Bulgaria 890 1,385 7,145 11,080 20,365 19,420
11 For further information on bilateral and multilateral agreements between the EU and 
North African countries, see (Klepp, 2010; McDonough and Tsourdi, 2012; Casas-Cortes, 
Pickles and Cobarrubias, 2010, 2013). 
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Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Belgium 31,910 28,075 21,030 22,710 44,660 18,280
Spain 3,420 2,565 4,485 5,615 14,780 15,755
Poland 6,885 10,750 15,240 8,020 12,190 12,305
Denmark 3,945 6,045 7,170 14,680 20,935 6,180
Finland 2,915 3,095 3,210 3,620 32,345 5,605
Cyprus 1,770 1,635 1,255 1,745 2,265 2,940
Ireland 1,290 955 945 1,450 3,275 2,245
Croatia  807  1195 1,075 450 210 2,225
Luxembourg 2,150 2,050 1,070 1,150 2,505 2,160
Malta 1,890 2,080 2,245 1,350 1,845 1,930
Romania 1,720 2,510 1,495 1,545 1,260 1,880
Czech Republic 750 740 695 1,145 1,515 1,475
Portugal 275 295 500 440 895 1,460
Slovenia 355 295 270 385 275 1,310
Lithuania 525 645 400 440 315 430
Latvia 340 205 195 375 330 350
Estonia 65 75 95 155 230 175
Slovakia 490 730 440 330 330 145
Source: Eurostat (2017b) Asylum applications withdrawn by citizenship, age and sex Annual 
aggregated data (rounded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_
asywitha&lang=en; Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia (2014). Statistički poka-
zatelji tražitelja azila 2008. – 2014. po državljanstvima, Zagreb, https://www.mup.hr/public/
documents/Statistika/Statistički pokazatelji tražitelja azila 2008. -– 2014. po državljanstvi-
ma.pdf
The period from 2011 to 2013 served as a prelude to the “European 
refugee/migrant crisis”. It was marked by a rapid increase of the number 
of asylum applicants (Table 1, 2, 3 and Figure 2, 3), which was the conse-
quence of the outbreak and intensification of the conflicts in Syria, Libya, 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia and due to the poor economic conditions 
in the neighbouring countries to the EU. Rapid growth was not noted for 
all the EU members, so important shifts occurred in the spatial dispersion 
of the asylum seekers. Germany became the most important host by far, as 
it hosted almost 30% of all asylum seekers in the EU in 2013. A dramatic 
increase was also noted in Sweden, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. On the 
other hand, France, Great Britain, Belgium and Italy recorded a relatively 
low growth or even a decrease in the number of applications.
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Table 2.  Individual countries' share of asylum applicants as a share of the 
EU total between 2011 and 2016 (%)
Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Germany 17.2 23.1 29.4 32.3 36.0 59.1
Hungary 0.5 0.6 4.4 6.8 13.4 2.3
Sweden 9.6 13.1 12.6 12.9 12.3 2.3
Austria 4.7 5.2 4.1 4.5 6.7 3.4
Italy 13.0 5.2 6.2 10.3 6.3 9.8
France 18.6 18.3 15.4 10.3 5.8 6.7
Netherlands 4.7 3.9 3.0 3.9 3.4 1.7
Belgium 10.3 8.4 4.9 3.6 3.4 1.5
United Kingdom 8.7 8.6 7.1 5.2 3.0 3.1
Finland 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 2.4 0.4
Denmark 1.3 1.8 1.7 2.3 1.6 0.5
Bulgaria 0.3 0.4 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.5
Spain 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.3
Greece 3.0 2.9 1.9 1.5 1.0 4.1
Poland 2.2 3.2 3.5 1.3 0.9 1.0
Cyprus 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
Ireland 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Luxembourg 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Malta 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2
Romania 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
Czech Republic 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Portugal 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Croatia 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2
Slovenia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Lithuania 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Latvia 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Estonia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Slovakia 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
EU28 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Eurostat (2017b). Asylum applications withdrawn by citizenship, age and sex Annual 
aggregated data (rounded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_
asywitha&lang=en; Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia (2014). Statistički poka-
zatelji tražitelja azila 2008. – 2014. po državljanstvima, Zagreb, https://www.mup.hr/public/
documents/Statistika/Statistički pokazatelji tražitelja azila 2008. -– 2014. po državljanstvi-
ma.pdf
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Table 3.  Number of asylum applicants per 100,000 inhabitants in EU 
countries between 2011 and 2016 
Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Germany 66.4 96.5 157.4 250.9 586.9 906.8
Austria 172.2 207.1 207.1 329.6 1028.0 486.2
Greece 83.7 86.4 74.7 86.3 121.6 474.0
Malta 455.4 498.1 532.8 317.4 429.7 444.3
Luxembourg 420.1 390.6 199.2 209.2 445.0 374.8
Cyprus 210.8 189.7 144.9 203.4 267.4 346.6
Hungary 16.9 21.7 190.7 433.1 1797.3 299.4
Sweden 314.9 462.5 567.9 841.7 1666.6 292.3
Bulgaria 12.1 18.9 98.1 152.9 282.8 271.5
EU28 61.4 66.5 85.3 123.7 260.1 246.9
Italy 67.9 29.2 44.6 106.3 137.4 202.7
Belgium 290.1 253.0 188.4 203.1 397.4 161.6
France 88.2 94.1 101.0 97.5 114.6 126.2
Netherlands 87.6 78.3 77.8 145.5 266.1 123.4
Denmark 70.9 108.3 128.0 260.9 369.9 108.3
Finland 54.2 57.3 59.2 66.4 591.1 102.1
Slovenia 17.3 14.4 13.1 18.7 13.3 63.5
United Kingdom 42.7 45.4 47.9 50.9 61.9 59.3
Croatia 18.8 27.9 25.2 10.6 5.0 53.1
Ireland 28.2 20.8 20.6 31.5 70.8 47.5
Spain 7.3 5.5 9.6 12.1 31.8 33.9
Poland 18.1 28.2 40.0 21.1 32.1 32.4
Latvia 16.4 10.0 9.6 18.7 16.6 17.8
Lithuania 17.2 21.5 13.5 14.9 10.8 14.9
Portugal 2.6 2.8 4.8 4.2 8.6 14.1
Czech Republic 7.2 7.0 6.6 10.9 14.4 14.0
Estonia 4.9 5.7 7.2 11.8 17.5 13.3
Romania 8.5 12.5 7.5 7.7 6.3 9.5
Slovakia 9.1 13.5 8.1 6.1 6.1 2.7
Source: Eurostat (2017b). Asylum applications withdrawn by citizenship, age and sex Annual 
aggregated data (rounded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_
asywitha&lang=en; Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia (2014). Statistički poka-
zatelji tražitelja azila 2008. – 2014. po državljanstvima, Zagreb, https://www.mup.hr/public/
documents/Statistika/Statistički pokazatelji tražitelja azila 2008. -– 2014. po državljanstvi-
ma.pdf
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Figure 2.  Individual countries' share of asylum applicants as a share of 
the EU total in 2011 and index of asylum applicants per capita 
compared to EU average in 2011 
Note: On average 61.4 asylum applicants per 100,000 inhabitants were recorded in 
the EU in 2011.
Source: Eurostat (2017b). Asylum applications withdrawn by citizenship, age and sex Annual 
aggregated data (rounded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_
asywitha&lang=en. 
These changes were the result of various factors, one of the more rel-
evant being the redirection of the migrants to the Balkan migration route. 
This occurred due to the aforementioned measures in the Western and 
Central Mediterranean and the increased oversight on the intra-Schengen 
routes from Greece. In the past, migrants would freely continue on with 
their journey to other EU countries after arriving in Greece, as there was 
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no systematic passenger control on the regular intra-Schengen sea and air 
routes. This practice was abandoned in 2011. The Balkan migration route 
became the fastest and safest route to other EU members for an increasing 
number of migrants in Greece. Its popularity was further strengthened by 
two processes. The first was the abolishment of the visa regime for some 
western Balkan countries12. This led to a decreased border control and a 
heavy increase in the border flow of people and goods in the area of the 
Balkan migration route. The other reason was the liberalization of the Hun-
garian asylum legislation. In accordance with it, asylum applicants were 
housed in open holding centres. This greatly increased Hungary’s appeal as 
a country of transit, as applicants could submit their application, then con-
tinue on their journey to other EU countries13 (Frontex, 2010, 2012a, 2012b; 
Lukić, 2016; McDonough and Tsourdi, 2012).
The rapid growth of asylum applicants in the EU continued into 2014 
(Table 1, 2, 3), when their numbers exceeded 600,000. The prevalent trends 
from the previous years continued. Germany was still the key host country, 
as it hosted almost a third of all asylum applicants in the EU. Due to the in-
creasing significance of the Balkan migration route, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Austria also recorded rapid growth. A key factor for creating certain transit 
routes was the inability or unpreparedness of the countries on the route. 
Their passive border management policies enabled those with at least some 
financial means to travel from Greece to Austria or Germany relatively in-
expensively, quickly and safely (Tinti and Reitano, 2016; Videmšek, 2016). 
Italy also recorded a great increase in the number of asylum applicants. The 
political chaos that erupted after the fall of Gadhafi’s regime in Libya cre-
ated ideal conditions for the smuggling industry (Tinti and Reitano, 2016). 
Consequently, the central Mediterranean migration route was revived in 
late 201314. 
On the other side, France’s and Great Britain’s roles kept diminishing. 
The former hosted only 10% and the latter only 5% of all asylum applicants 
12 The liberalisation of the Visa regime to biometric passport-holders from Albania and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina led to a sharp increase in the number of asylum claims from those 
two countries. Nationals from Western Balkan states could enter the EU under a visa-free 
regime and later on file an asylum request in one of the member states. Combined, the 
asylum applications from the five visa-exempt Western Balkan nationalities amounted to 
roughly 15% of all asylum applications in the EU and to around 95% of asylum applica-
tions submitted by visa-free nationalities (Eurostat, 2017a; Frontex, 2012b, p. 5).
13 This policy was reverted in 2017 when Hungarian parliament approved a law allowing all 
asylum seekers to be detained (Dearden, 2017).
14 The high death toll led the Italian government to launch the Mare Nostrum rescue mis-
sion in late 2013.
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in the EU. A very small number of asylum applicants applied for asylum in 
new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe (with the exception 
of Hungary and Bulgaria). This can be associated with their weaker eco-
nomic condition compared to some other member states, the non-existent 
tradition of immigration and a poor reputation of refugee and asylum ap-
plicant protection. 
Figure 3.  Individual countries’ share of asylum applicants as a share of 
the EU total in 2013 and index of asylum applicants per capita 
compared to EU average in 2013 
Note: On average 85.3 asylum applicants per 100,000 inhabitants were recorded in 
the EU in 2013.
Source: Eurostat (2017b). Asylum applications withdrawn by citizenship, age and sex Annual 
aggregated data (rounded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_
asywitha&lang=en.
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At the height of the “crisis” (from the spring of 2015 to the spring of 
2016), the European Union witnessed a high increase in the number of asy-
lum applications (Table 1, 2, 3 and Figure 4). The rise was the direct result 
of different interrelated factors. The intensification of the conflicts in Syria, 
Iraq and Afghanistan in early 2015 strengthened the flow of refugees into 
Turkey, which resulted in over-crowdedness in refugee camps. The Turk-
ish authorities responded to the new conditions with a more lax control 
of the sea border with Greece. Smugglers exploited the emerging situa-
tion and drastically increased the refugee transfer via the so-called Eastern 
Mediterranean migration route. Greece was not able to take in such a large 
number of asylum applicants, so it did not impede their journey. The rest 
of the countries on the Balkan migration route adopted a similar approach. 
Asylum seekers from other nationalities took advantage of the situation. 
An important stimulant was Germany’s public declaration of an open door 
policy and the decision to apply the discretionary clause in the Dublin III 
Regulation for Syrian refugees in August 2015 (Sardelić, 2017). 
Organizing travel and refugee care was left to individuals or non-
government organizations at first; later, various state institutions collabo-
rated with non-government organizations to take over transport, supply 
and temporary housing. Consequently, the period from September 2015 to 
March 2016 saw the formation of the Balkan corridor15 (Beznec, Speer and 
Stojić Mitrović, 2016; Lunaček and Meh, 2016). The existence of the corri-
dor enabled refugees to relatively quickly and safely arrive at their selected 
asylum destinations in the EU16. As a result, all EU members except Croatia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia noted an increased rise of asylum appli-
cants in 2015. Three key countries at the end of the Balkan corridor—Ger-
many, Hungary and Austria—received over 740,000 asylum applications 
combined (over 56% of all applications in the EU).
15 The Balkan corridor was established when nation states started to facilitate and orga-
nize the transportation of refugees from one border to another (for details see Kogovšek 
Šalamon, 2016; Kogovšek Šalamon and Bajt, 2016)
16 The author shares the opinion of those researchers who claim that the organization of the 
supply, accommodation and transport for the refugees by the respective countries was 
not a humanitarian gesture, but a crucial step for establishing control and ultimately stop-
ping the refugee flow (see Lunaček and Meh, 2016; Petrović, 2016). 
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Figure 4.  Individual countries' share of asylum applicants as a share of 
the EU total in 2015 and index of asylum applicants per capita 
compared to EU average in 2015 
Note: On average 260.1 asylum applicants per 100,000 inhabitants were recorded in 
the EU in 2015.
Source: Eurostat (2017b). Asylum applications withdrawn by citizenship, age and sex Annual 
aggregated data (rounded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_
asywitha&lang=en.
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In the period from September 2015 to January 2016, seven countries17 in 
the Schengen border system re-established internal border control. Some 
countries even went a step further and began erecting a wire fence in some 
of the most exposed border areas in order to deter refugees. By erecting a 
fence on the border with Serbia and Croatia, Hungary managed to redirect 
refugee transit towards Slovenia and Croatia. The newly constructed fence 
on the Macedonian-Greek border in late November 2015 had an even great-
er influence on the spatial distribution of the asylum applicants. 
These measures strengthened efforts to close down the Balkan corridor. 
Due to a fear that the German and Austrian borders would be completely 
closed, the countries of transit began a coordinated action to close the cor-
ridor18. At the same time, efforts to halt the transit on the Eastern Mediter-
ranean route between Turkey and Greece gained strength at the EU level. 
In late March 2016, an agreement was signed between the EU and Turkey, 
which allowed Greece to extradite all “illegal immigrants” back to Turkey. 
Enforced border control on EU’s internal borders, closing the Balkan cor-
ridor on the Macedonian-Greek border and the agreement between the EU 
and Turkey created new conditions that crucially influenced the dispersion 
of asylum applicants in 2016 (Table 1, 2, 3 and Figure 5). The increased con-
trol at the internal Schengen borders dramatically decreased the inflow of 
new asylum applicants in Scandinavian countries. The closed Balkan corri-
dor also greatly decreased the inflow of applicants to Austria and Hungary, 
while their numbers multiplied in Greece. After the Eastern Mediterranean 
route was closed down, the Central Mediterranean route from Libya to Italy 
again gained popularity. In late 2016, Italy once more became the central 
entry point into the EU, as it recorded a great increase of asylum applicants. 
17 Germany was the first to introduce control on its internal borders. In September, it 
launched a border control operation at the border with Austria. Austria and Slovenia soon 
followed Germany’s example and Hungary, Sweden, Denmark and Norway followed 
later. Even though this is supposed to be a temporary measure (European Commission, 
2015), five countries still continue the practice at the time of writing (Germany, Austria, 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway). Hungary and Slovenia discontinued the practice in late 
October 2015.
18 The Balkan corridor started closing on 18 November 2015 when Macedonian authorities 
granted border crossing only to refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The Macedo-
nian-Greek border finally closed completely on 8 March 2016 (Lunaček and Meh, 2016). 
The closed corridor on the Macedonian-Greek border was the result of the coordinated 
actions of Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia and supported by Visegrad 
countries and Germany. 
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Figure 5.  Individual countries’ share of asylum applicants as a share of 
the EU total in 2016 and index of asylum applicants per capita 
compared to EU average in 2016 
Note: On average 246.9 asylum applicants per 100,000 inhabitants were recorded in 
the EU in 2016. 
Source: Eurostat (2017b). Asylum applications withdrawn by citizenship, age and sex Annual 
aggregated data (rounded), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_
asywitha&lang=en.
The role of most important host country in 2016 once again went to Ger-
many, which hosted 745,155 asylum applicants, which is almost 60% of 
all applicants in the EU. This high number is somewhat surprizing, as the 
closed Balkan corridor and border control on the Austrian border would 
lean one to expect similar trends as in other host countries. We can only 
speculate on the causes for this increase. Whether the increase was the re-
Migracijske i etničke teme 33 (2017), 2: 191–219
212
sult of new arrivals through different channels or the result of secondary 
migrations from other EU countries in 2016 remains unanswered and open 
for further research.
CONCLUSIONS
The media labelled the mass arrival of refugees to the area of the Euro-
pean Union during the 2015–2016 period as a “European refugee/migrant 
crisis”. This geopolitical designation carries specific perceptions and cate-
gorisations that effect one’s understanding of the event. Using the term Eu-
rope or European creates a binary division, in which “Europe” is presented 
as a key host area and the neighbouring countries to Europe as the source 
or transit area of asylum applicants. Refugees or asylum applicants then 
become an expressly European problem, but what is unsaid is that we have 
been witness to a quickly growing number of forced migrations around 
the world in the past decade and that Europe and the rest of the developed 
world host only a smaller share of the refugees (Rogelj, 2017). 
The other perception created by the use of the geographical designation 
“Europe/European” is the notion of Europe and the European Union as a 
unified, borderless space, in which asylum applicants are free to select their 
destination. Accordingly, their spatial distribution is said to be the result of 
careful planning based on the wishes and calculations of individuals. The 
data analysis on asylum applicants in the EU between 2011 and 2016 has 
shown that this is not the case. During the analysed period, numerous fast 
changes occurred in the spatial dispersion that cannot be attributed to the 
wishes and interests of the individuals. 
The spatial dispersion of asylum seekers has been influenced by multi-
ple interrelated factors, on which asylum seekers had no influence. The ar-
ticle focuses on only one of them, namely the changes in the border regimes 
in the European Union and its neighbourhood. Modern migration flows 
exhibit a high level of adaptability to the current political, economic and 
social conditions. Increased or decreased border control at EU’s internal 
borders has an important influence on the transit routes and selection of the 
countries of asylum. 
There are of course other, equally important factors influencing the dis-
tribution of asylum seekers during the “European refugee/migrant crisis” 
that the article does not address. Among them different aspects of the Com-
mon European Asylum Policy (especially the Dublin III Regulation and re-
admission agreements), important differences in the implementation of the 
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common asylum policy (despite the efforts to harmonize the asylum pro-
cedures and the rights of asylum seekers) and above all the growing trend 
in securitization, militarization and externalization of the EU migration 
and asylum policy, have to be acknowledged (see Allen et al., 2017; Beznec, 
Speer and Stojić Mitrović, 2016; Ibrahim, 2005; Jones and Johnson, 2016). 
All the above-mentioned factors indicate that the spatial dispersion of the 
asylum applicants is therefore the result of circumstance, not of planned 
actions.
Finally, attention should be raised on the transitory nature of modern 
migrations, due to which the analysis results do not illustrate the actual 
picture of the spatiality of the “European refugee/migrant crisis”. Asylum 
applicants often have a very limited knowledge of the host countries and 
their asylum policies, which is particularly true for those who left their 
homeland in a hurry without a plan (Brekke and Aarset, 2009). For many 
people, the basic goal is to come to Europe or the European Union. They 
only begin to contemplate their asylum destination after their arrival in 
the first European country and their decision is often influenced by infor-
mation and rumours they had heard on their journey. At the same time, it 
should be noted that the increasing illegalisation of forced migrations and 
the European or national asylum policies often force individuals to submit 
an asylum application in countries of transit located at the EU outer border. 
The described reasons cause so-called secondary or transit migrations from 
member states, through which asylum applicants enter the EU (see Brekke 
and Brochmann, 2015; McDonough and Tsourdi, 2012; Valenta, Zuparic-
Iljic and Vidovic, 2015). These have an important influence on the spatial 
dispersion of asylum applicants within the EU. Further analysis must focus 
on this specific aspect of the phenomenon, especially what is the reason and 
what information is the basis for the asylum applicants’ decision to change 
their country of asylum. 
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“Europska izbjeglička/migrantska kriza” geopolitička je oznaka kojom su mediji, po-
litika i šira javnost obilježili dolazak velikog broja izbjeglica u Europsku uniju 2015. i 
2016. godine. U članku se analizira prostorna raspodjela tražitelja azila u Europskoj 
uniji od 2011. do 2016. Usredotočuje se na to kako su promjene graničnih režima na 
vanjskim i unutarnjim granicama Europske unije utjecale na kretanje tražitelja azila 
i prostornu raspodjelu zahtjeva za azil tijekom »krize«. To skreće pozornost na sve 
veću važnost militarizacije granica i sekuritizaciju migracijskih tokova na prostornoj 
raspodjeli podnositelja zahtjeva za azil. Istraživanje se temelji na analizi Eurostat po-
dataka o ukupnom broju podnositelja zahtjeva za azil u državama članicama između 
2011. i 2016. Iako promjene u graničnim režimima nisu jedini čimbenik koji utječe na 
prostornu raspodjelu tražitelja azila tijekom »europske izbjegličke/migrantske kri-
ze«, njihovi se učinci mogu iskoristiti kako bi se pokazale granice s kojima se azilanti 
susreću na svojem putu. Glavni je cilj članka problematizirati upotrebu geografske 
oznake »Europa«/»europski« u kontekstu »izbjegličke/migrantske krize«. Ta upotre-
ba stvara percepciju jedinstvenoga, bezgraničnog prostora u kojemu pojedinci mogu 
slobodno izabrati svoje azilno odredište. Diskurs »europska izbjeglička/migrantska 
kriza« Europsku uniju često predstavlja kao »otvoreni trgovački centar za azil« u 
kojemu tražitelji azila mogu odabrati bilo koju zemlju domaćina. Članak se suprot-
stavlja tom pojmu te naglašava ograničenja i učinak koji kontingencija (slučajnost) 
igra u izboru odredišta azila.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI: migracije, izbjeglice, granični režimi, Europska unija, „Europska 
izbjeglička/migrantska kriza“

